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ABSTRACT 
 
In order to evaluate the progressivity of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
premiums in a coastal US state that is directly exposed to the impact of climate change- 
induced sea level rise, this study examines the relationship between the average NFIP 
premium and the average property values of NFIP insured properties in 331 
Massachusetts municipalities. We utilize community level average premium to property 
value ratio as a measure for comparison. Findings reveal an inverse relationship between 
insurance premiums paid (as a percentage of property value) and total property value. 
The greater the average property value, the lower the average premium paid. Conversely, 
the lower the average property value, the greater the average premium paid. In addition, 
the study analyzes subsets of municipalities that had certain thresholds of total property 
in flood prone areas. The strength of the inverse relationship between insurance 
premiums paid and total property value increases when subsets of municipalities with 
greater total property value at-risk are analyzed independently. Results suggest current 
policies in setting flood insurance rates in Massachusetts result in regressive premiums 
and, as a result, can increase incentives for risk taking. 
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Overview of Study 
 
In October 2014 the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) provided flood 
insurance to eligible property owners in 331 Massachusetts municipalities, and insured a 
total of 57,972 properties.1  Collectively, the stated value of these properties was 
approximately $15.3 billion. Annual premiums collected on the $15.3 billion of insured 
property equaled $77.2 million. The ratio of total premium to total property value insured 
by the NFIP in the Commonwealth is 0.51percent. The average value of a Bay State 
property insured through the NFIP is $263,179.2  
This study examined the relationship between NFIP premiums paid and the value 
of the property being insured.  The 331 NFIP participating communities in Massachusetts 
were ranked based on the ratio of the average NFIP premium for each municipality to the 
average value of the property covered in that same municipality. For example, a 
community with an average property value of $250,000 paying an average insurance 
premium of $1,250 would have a ratio of insurance to property value of 0.50 percent 
($1,250 / $250,000). Municipalities were first ranked by the value of this ratio and the 
results were then analyzed using a linear regression approach. The goal of this analysis 
was to determine whether there were consistent statistical relationships between average 
premium-to-property ratios across participating Massachusetts municipalities.  In other 
words, did NFIP eligible municipalities with similar average property values pay similar 
                                                
1 The terms “properties” and “property” used in this paper refers to all developed property covered by NFIP 
policies. These properties could be residential, commercial, industrial, etc. Data relied upon for the analysis 
in this paper did not distinguish between different types of developed property. 
2 Average insured property calculated by dividing the total value of property insured in the Commonwealth 
($15.3 billion) by the total number of policies in-effect (57,972). 
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average NFIP premiums? Furthermore, were average NFIP premiums progressive (did 
higher value properties pay higher premiums) or regressive (did higher value properties 
pay lower premiums)?  
Subsets of municipalities based on their total property value covered by the NFIP 
were also examined. For this component of the analysis, municipalities were organized 
into the following subsets: greater than $25 million in value, greater than $50 million in 
value, greater than $100 million in value, greater than $200 million in value, and over 
$300 million in value. These thresholds are meant to represent increasing levels of risk 
with higher values implying greater levels of risk. In order to use total property value in a 
municipality as a metric for risk differentiation between communities, this study assumes 
that the background rate of flood risk is constant across municipalities where national 
flood insurance is required.3 By holding background risk of flooding constant between 
municipalities, total property value at-stake in a municipality can then act as a measure of 
risk since more stands to be lost in the event of a flood. This approach allowed for 
examination of subsets of municipalities in Massachusetts that vary by the degree of risk 
they experience, measured as the total amount of property value under insurance in that 
municipality. 
 
 
 
                                                
3 There are numerous factors that influence the risk of flooding between communities in Massachusetts. 
For example, NFIP contains a rating system with incentives for communities to develop flood resiliency. 
Furthermore, some communities may be located in less risk prone areas, and others may have land use 
planning measures that are more protective and forward-looking. However, this study assumes that, on 
average, the risk to areas that have national flood insurance requirements is spread relatively evenly and is, 
for interpretive purposes, essentially equal. 
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Methods 
 The data set used to support the analysis comes from the NFIP’s Policy Statistics 
as of October 2014.4 The raw data made available by NFIP includes the following 
information: State, municipality by county, number of flood insurance policies in-force, 
whole dollar value of insurance in-force (total property value insured), written premium 
in-force (total value of premiums assessed). 
The information is provided for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and for each 
municipality by county. These data were used to calculate average insurance premiums 
using average property values for Massachusetts as a whole and for each of the 331 
participating municipalities. The average insurance premium for the municipality was 
then divided by the average property value for that same municipality to arrive at a ratio 
of flood insurance to property value. These municipal level ratios were then examined 
using scatter plots, where the average property value (independent or explanatory 
variable) of each municipality was placed on the x-axis and the average insurance ratio of 
each municipality (dependent or outcome variable) was placed on the y-axis. A simple 
linear regression was then conducted to determine the best fit of the data and to assess the 
relationship between these two variables.  R squared values were calculated to assess the 
“goodness of fit” between the data points and the regression line and the explanatory 
power of this straightforward regression model. 
 This general approach was used to analyze both municipal level data for all 331 
participating Massachusetts communities and subsets of communities organized by the 
value of property with NFIP insurance coverage.  As noted earlier, subsets were defined 
                                                
4 Data (updated regularly) are available at: http://bsa.nfipstat.fema.gov/reports/1011.htm. The October 2014 
data set used for this analysis is available upon request. 
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using a series of aggregate property value thresholds being insured in order to assess the 
relationship between community risk and NFIP premium. For the purposes of this 
analysis, risk was defined in terms of the total value of property being insured in a given 
community with more property value under insurance indicating greater risk. Five subsets 
of communities were examined: those with over $25 million in value under insurance, 
over $50 million in value, over  $100 million in value, over $200 million in value, and 
over $300 million. R squared values were used to assess each of the 331 individual 
municipalities as well as the five subsets of municipalities organized by aggregate 
property value.  
Results 
  A summary of the relevant data yielded from the analysis for all municipalities 
requiring flood insurance (“All Cases”) and the subsets of communities with threshold 
total property under insurance is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary Information of Flood Insurance Analysis 
 All Cases Over $25 Million 
Over $50 
Million 
Over $100 
Million 
Over $200 
Million 
Over $300 
Million 
Total 
Communities 331 105 72 40 18 12 
Total NFIP 
Policies in force 57,972 51,269 47,345 37,917 26,460 20,825 
Correlation -0.513 -0.547 -0.507 -0.568 -0.651 -0.616 
R squared Value 0.263 0.280 0.257 0.323 0.423 0.380 
 
As of October 2014, the 331 municipalities in Massachusetts that participate in 
the NFIP were home to 57,972 discrete properties that were covered by national flood 
insurance.  The correlation between the premium paid and the aggregate property value 
  
  
Subsidizing Risk -7- 
covered by NFIP insurance for each subset of data is presented in Table 1. Notably, all 
subsets show a negative correlation value, indicating an inverse relationship between the 
average insurance ratio and average property value: The higher the total value of the 
property in a given community or subset of communities that is being insured, the lower 
the ratio between property value and premium paid. The R square values for each of the 
scenarios evaluated are revealing and can be found in Table 1.  On average, the 
“goodness of fit”, as measured by the R squared value, between the data points and the 
regression line increases as the aggregate property insured in a municipality increases.  
The regressive nature of these relationships can be most clearly seen in Figures 1-6.  
 
Figure 1: Average Insurance Ratio and Average Policy Value for All Municipalities 
in Massachusetts 
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Figure 2: Average Insurance Ratio and Average Policy Value for Municipalities in 
Massachusetts with At Least $25 Million in Property Insured For Flood Loss 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Average Insurance Ratio and Average Policy Value for Municipalities in 
Massachusetts with At Least $50 Million in Property Insured For Flood Loss 
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Figure 4: Average Insurance Ratio and Average Policy Value for Municipalities in 
Massachusetts with At Least $100 Million in Property Insured For Flood Loss 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Average Insurance Ratio and Average Policy Value for Municipalities in 
Massachusetts with At Least $200 Million in Property Insured For Flood Loss 
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Figure 6: Average Insurance Ratio and Average Policy Value for Municipalities in 
Massachusetts with At Least $300 Million in Property Insured For Flood Loss 
 
 
 
 
 Figures 1-6 all show a negative or inverse relationship between NFIP insurance 
premiums and property values. As the average property value increases for a community, 
the amount of insurance paid as a share of that property value decreases. This finding 
holds true for all 331 municipalities in Massachusetts (Figure 1). Further, when 
municipalities with relatively lower total property values are excluded from the analysis, 
the overall fit between average property values and cost of insurance improves (Figures 
2-6) as reflected in the increasing R squared values for subsets of communities with 
higher insured property values. As Figures 2-6 show, the negative correlation strengthens 
with higher value thresholds signaling a more regressive relationship between premium 
cost and average property value as total property value at-risk of flooding increases. 
Discussion 
 The results of this study reveal an inverse and regressive relationship between 
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property values and flood insurance premiums in Massachusetts under the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP). On average, municipalities in Massachusetts with higher 
value properties pay proportionately less for national flood insurance than municipalities 
with lower value properties. This relationship remains even when we control for risk, 
measured as the total amount of property insured in a particular municipality. In fact, 
municipalities with greater amounts of total property under insurance (and thus greater 
risk) have a stronger negative relationship between property value and flood insurance 
premiums than communities with lower values.  
 These results clearly demonstrate the regressive nature of the NFIP rate setting 
process in Massachusetts. Owners of lower value (and by extension less risky) properties 
pay disproportionately more for their NFIP flood insurance than their neighbors in 
communities with higher value properties. This pattern holds true in all 331 participating 
municipalities despite the fact that these communities otherwise share similar flood risk 
characteristics. In traditional insurance underwriting, premiums are set based on 
numerous factors, but two critical factors are the probability of loss and the total amount 
of value at-risk from loss (AAA, 2011). Assuming probability of loss due to flooding is 
relatively constant across NFIP eligible communities in Massachusetts, in a traditional 
insurance environment, one would expect the opposite outcome (i.e., higher property 
value is associated with higher premiums).  
 There are a number of reasons why higher value properties in Massachusetts 
might be paying proportionately less for flood insurance. For instance, the NFIP has a 
rating system that provides potential discounts to certain communities that engage in best 
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practices to mitigate flood risk.5 In addition, NFIP insurance is capped at a specific dollar 
amount of exposure per property.6 Thus the cap may act as a ceiling for flood insurance 
premiums. In such a case higher value properties would appear to be paying 
proportionately less for flood insurance because the property values exceed the amount 
covered under national flood insurance and the premium charged is capped at the payout 
maximum.7 While these are plausible rationales for the differences observed, specific 
reasons for the counterintuitive findings are beyond the scope of this paper and 
necessitate further study. 
 Regardless of the reasons for the regressive nature of the NFIP as currently 
operating in Massachusetts, the influence of lower premiums on ratepayers can be 
substantial. This has to do with risk perception, or how the public develops, understands, 
and internalizes the concept of risk, and the role that flood insurance premiums play in 
risk perception. Risk perception is a term often used to describe a measure of risk that 
incorporates both objective and subjective factors (Slovic, 1987; Sjoberg, 1999; Sjoberg, 
2000). Insurance premiums provide an important signal of risk to the insured: the higher 
the premium paid, the greater the perception of risk associated with the activity being 
insured and vice-versa (Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Siegrist and Gutscher, 2006; Petrolia et 
al., 2013).  
                                                
5 Details on the NFIP Community Rating System are available here: 
https://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-community-rating-system  
 
6 A summary of flood insurance coverage through the NFIP as of March 2015 is available here: 
https://www.floodsmart.gov/toolkits/flood/downloads/NFIP-SummaryCoverage.pdf  
 
7 For example, the NFIP might cap flood insurance payments at $250,000 of loss. Properties that are up to 
$250,000 in value, but not higher, might pay a “full” premium for flood insurance. Properties valued at 
more than $250,000 might pay a premium that is capped at the first $250,000 of value. 
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The passage of a national flood insurance program in 1968 was necessitated in 
large part by the federal government recognizing that a lack of mandatory flood insurance 
created a moral hazard that incentivized coastal development, even in very dangerous 
areas (Knowles and Kunreuther, 2014). A moral hazard existed because federal disaster 
relief was regularly made available after a natural disaster, essentially providing a de 
facto zero premium insurance backstop for coastal development (Michel-Kerjan, 2010). 
The NFIP was created to begin sharing flooding risks with flood-prone communities, thus 
creating incentives for less risky behavior through insurance price signaling (Anderson, 
1974). Moral hazard would be diminished through a mix of risk shifting behavior 
(brought on by flood insurance requirements) and penalties for non-compliance as failure 
to carry insurance could result in loss of federal disaster assistance eligibility (Anderson, 
1974; CRS, 2013). It may be that factors such as political shaping has limited the 
influence of the NFIP, importantly the subsidies inherent in current flood insurance 
policies (PCI, 2011). 
Even with existing subsidies across the board, the findings in this paper suggest 
additional hidden subsidies that further frustrate risk internalization. Massachusetts 
properties currently covered under the NFIP enjoy federally subsidized flood insurance 
backed up by federal disaster relief funding. But higher value properties that require flood 
insurance (i.e., exist in flood prone areas) pay proportionately less for their flood 
insurance then lower valued properties. This does little to protect against speculation in 
coastal property development by creating an additional subsidy for high value properties. 
One effect is that housing stock may be pricier than it may otherwise be if flood 
insurance premiums more accurately reflected the actual risks of flood related losses. 
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Conclusion 
 The findings in this study demonstrate that current federal policy in setting 
national flood insurance premiums disproportionately favors higher value property 
owners in Massachusetts. To the extent the outcomes of current federal flood insurance 
policy engender the regressive relationship shown in this study, such outcomes are 
counterproductive in aiding property owners and communities to recognize current and 
future risks associated with living in coastal areas, particularly through insurance 
premium price signaling. Subsidized rate setting can encourage risky property owner 
behavior, potentially exposing the American taxpayer to avoidable and substantial 
financial liabilities. Subsidies also encourage discounting of risks, making it harder for 
communities and property owners to take appropriate action to mitigate the increasing 
risks associated with living in flood prone areas. 
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